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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

V,

:

Case No. 950786-CA

SANDRA WALKER,

:

Priority No. 2

De f endant/Appe11&nt.

:

BRttEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions on two counts of
possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) within 1,000 feet
of a church, second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(5)(a)(ix)(1996), and one count of possession of a
controlled substance (marijuana) with intent to distribute, also
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(1)(a)(iv)(1996).

The Court has jurisdiction over the appeal

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1996).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Where the written plea agreement does not reveal any
prosecutorial promise to remain silent at sentencing and where
neither party could produce any evidence that the prosecution had
agreed to remain silent at sentencing, can defendant prevail in
his contention that the State breached the plea agreement by
recommending prison?
In the absence of any factual showing on the record to
support defendant's contention, this Court uhas no choice but to
assume the regularity of the proceedings below."

Call v. City of

West Jordan, 788 p.2d 1049, 1053 (Utah), cert, denied, 800 p.2d
1105 (Utah 1990).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant law is cited in the body of this brief,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant pled guilty in two cases to three second degree
felonies, arising out of her possession of various controlled
substances (Tr. 8-11; #480 at 41-42/ #481 at 36)- 1 The court

1

The record on appeal contains a single transcript, which
includes all of the relevant trial court proceedings, and is
designated wTr." in this brief. The record on appeal also
contains two trial court records. Throughout this brief, case
2

subsequently sentenced defendant to concurrent one-to-fifteen
year terms in the Utah State Prison on each count (Tr. 32; #4 80
at 44, #481 at 36).

This timely appeal followed (#480 at 51;

#481 at 40).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant was originally charged, in two cases, with two
first degree felonies, one second degree felony, and one class A
misdemeanor (Tr. 8). After initially pleading not guilty to all
charges, defendant changed her plea and entered guilty pleas to
three second degree felonies (#480 at 28-29; #481 at 28-29) .
Prior to entering her pleas, defendant signed a Statement of
Defendant in Advance of Plea of Guilty.

See Addendum.

In that

written document, the agreement reached with the State was
plainly articulated:

defendant would enter her pleas in exchange

for the State's agreement to reduce two first degree felonies to
second degree felonies, dismiss the class A misdemeanor, and
forego charging her with a first degree felony in a third, as yet
uncharged, case (Tr. 33-34 or Addendum).

Defendant also

represented in the written agreement that no threats or promises
had been made to induce her to enter the pleas and that no one

number 951900480 will be designated w#480ff and case number
951900481 will be designated w#481".
3

had told her that she would receive any form of leniency as a
result of her pleas (Tr. 34 or Addendum).
Prior to accepting defendant's pleas, the trial court
questioned defendant closely about her understanding and intent
in entering her pleas.

The court asked her if she was pleading

guilty to the elements of the crimes because she felt she was
guilty of them, and defendant answered "no" (Tr. 15). The court
then clarified that defendant was entering her pleas because she
wished to "avoid the chances of being convicted of a more
substantial or higher degree felony" (Tr. 16). The court
specifically confirmed that the pleas had not been induced by any
promises concerning sentencing (Tr. 16-17).

In addition, defense

counsel made a record with regard to the written plea agreement,
confirming that his client had read and understood its contents
(Tr. 21).
On the date set for sentencing, defendant's assigned counsel
was not present.

Another attorney representing defendant urged

the court to consider a long-term, in-patient drug treatment
program for defendant rather than a prison sentence (Tr. 23-24).
When the court turned to the State for input, the prosecutor
said: "Your honor, I'm looking for notes in my file, and I -- it
seems to me like I recall that we may have agreed to remain
4

silent on sentencing on this" (Tr. 24). Defense counsel chimed
in, "That's the plea bargain, yes" (IsL.) . The court then
continued the matter, ordering defense counsel to "come back with
some [sentencing] alternatives" (Tr. 25).
At the sentencing hearing, after several continuances,
defense counsel reported on four drug treatment programs, none of
which were available at the time (Tr. 28-29).

The court

responded that it was "inclined to impose the prison sentence" as
a faster way to get defendant into eventual treatment (Id.).
After further discussion with defense counsel, the Court turned
to the State, and the State recommended prison (Tr. 30-31).
At this juncture, the following interjection occurred:
Defendant:

Your honor, as far as my plea bargain, the
reason that I signed it is that the state
would make no recommendation one way or the
other on sentencing. That was just violated.

D. Counsel:

I think that's correct, your honor.

Defendant:

I know it's correct.

That was part of my

plea bargain.
(Tr. 31). The transcript at this point indicates that counsel
for the State searched both his file and the file of his
predecessor, looking for notes that might corroborate defendant's
assertion.

Counsel for defendant likewise searched through the

plea agreement for a handwritten note commemorating such an
5

agreement (Tr. 31-32).

When neither attorney could find any

corroboration for defendant's statement, the court sentenced
defendant to three concurrent one-to-fifteen year terms in the
Utah State Prison (Tr. 32).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Before defendant can prevail on the argument that the State
breached its plea agreement by recommending prison at the
sentencing hearing, she must first establish that the State
promised to remain silent at sentencing.

Defendant has failed to

establish this preliminary fact.
There are two references in the transcript to remaining
silent at sentencing.

The first is a comment by the prosecutor

questioning her own recollection that the State may have agreed
to remain silent at sentencing (Tr. 24). The second is a comment
by defendant stating that she had pled guilty because the State
promised to make no recommendations at sentencing (Tr. 31). In
context, however, these remarks do not constitute persuasive
evidence of any promise by the State to remain silent.
The record evidence clearly attests to the fact that the
plea bargain did not include a promise by the State to remain
silent. First, defendant executed a Statement of Defendant in
Advance of Plea of Guilty, which precisely articulated the terms
6

•••

of the plea bargain and never made any reference to a promise by
the State to remain silent. And second, in the course of the
guilty plea hearing, the court closely questioned defendant about
her understanding and intent in entering the plea. Not only did
defendant confirm that no promises had been made to her, but she
also explained that she was entering the plea in order to avoid
the possibility of convictions on three first degree felonies.
In the context of this evidence, the prosecutor's remark is
fairly construed as an effort not to speak out unadvisedly, while
defendant's contention that a promise was made stands as an
attempt to capitalize on the prosecutor's earlier uncertainty.
Because the record contains no evidence that the State promised
to remain silent in exchange for defendant's guilty plea,
defendant's contention that the State breached the plea agreement
fails.

I ARGUMENT
WHERE THE RECORD ON APPEAL PROVIDES
NO EVIDENCE THAT THE STATE PROMISED
TO REMAIN SILENT AT SENTENCING, THE
STATE DID NOT BREACH THE PLEA
AGREEMENT BY RECOMMENDING PRISON AT
THE SENTENCING HEARING
Defendant's sole contention on appeal is that the State, by
recommending prison at the sentencing hearing, broke a promise

7

central to defendant's plea bargain (Br. of App. at 5).

Because

close examination of the record evidence relevant to this
contention fails to support the existence of any promise by the
State to remain silent, defendant's claim must fail.
The law is well-settled that a guilty plea must be knowing
and voluntary.

Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1996);

State v. Gibbons,

740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987); State v. Valencia. 776 P.2d
1332, 1334 (Utah App. 1989).

And, if a plea is induced by any

promises, "the essence of those promises must in some way be
known."

Santobello v. New York. 404 U.S. 257, 262-63 (1971).

It

logically follows, then, that wwhen a plea rests in any
significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor,
so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or
consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." Id. at 262. The
predicate condition for fulfillment of a promise, however, is
that a promise was actually made.2

In this case, the record does

not demonstrate that a promise to remain silent was ever made.
Defendant's assertion that the State promised to remain

2

Defendant urges application of the Santobello rule,
arguing that the facts are closely analogous to this case. See
Br. of App. at 7-8. The dispositive difference, however, is that
in Santobello, the State conceded it had promised to remain
silent at sentencing. Here, the State makes no such concession.

8

silent at sentencing hangs on two record references.

During the

first hearing scheduled for sentencing, after defense counsel
recommended that defendant be sentenced to a drug treatment
program, the court turned to the prosecutor, who commented, "Your
Honor, I'm looking for notes in my file, and I -- it seems to me
like I recall that we may have agreed to remain silent on
sentencing on this" (Tr. 24). Defense counsel, who had not been
present during the plea taking, stated, "That's the plea bargain,
yes" (Id.).

The court then continued the proceeding without

resolving the matter (Tr. 25).
The only other relevant reference came from defendant
herself at the sentencing hearing.

Just after the State

recommended prison, defendant announced:

"Your Honor, as far as

my plea bargain, the reason that I signed it is that the State
would make no recommendation one way or the other on sentencing.
That was just violated" (Tr. 31). Defendant's assigned counsel
opined: "I think that's correct, your Honor" (Id.).

Both parties

then searched their respective records for written commemoration
of the promise.

None was found.

On the basis of this scant record evidence -- the State's
ambivalent musing and defendant's own assertions -- defendant
presumes the existence of a promise that was central to the entry
9

of her guilty pleas.

Examining these two references in the

context of the entire record, however, reveals no persuasive
evidence of a promise.
First, the prosecutor's comment is nothing but that - - a
comment.

She wondered aloud if the State had promised to remain

silent, and then looked in her file to verify her possible
recollection (Tr. 24). Although the matter was not pursued at
that time, it came up again at sentencing.

The prosecutor who

had taken over the case searched both his file and his
predecessor's, finding no notes to substantiate any promise to
remain silent (Tr. 31-32).

Thus, in the context of written and

oral evidence explicitly stating the terms of the plea bargain,
the State's comment is most fairly construed as the musing of a
prosecutor who handled numerous cases on a daily basis and did
not want to err by speaking out unadvisedly on one of them.
Other more substantial evidence clearly attests to the fact
that the plea bargain did not include a promise by the State to
remain silent. Prior to entering her plea, defendant executed a
Statement of Defendant in Advance of Plea of Guilty, which
precisely articulated the terms agreed to by the parties:
13. The only plea agreement which has been
entered into with the government is: In
consideration of guilty pleas the State
10

agrees to reduce two first degree felonies to
possession of a controlled substance within
1000 feet of a church 2nd-Degree [sic]. The
State further agrees to dismiss the
possession of Marijuana charge (Class "A")
and not file other charges they know about.
R. 33-34 or Addendum.

In addition, defendant attested in the

Statement that wno promises of any sort [other than those
articulated in the Statement] have been made to me to induce me
or to persuade me to enter this plea" (R. 34 or Addendum).

She

also affirmed that no one had told her she would receive any form
of leniency as a result of entering her plea (Id.) .3 The written
plea agreement, then, contains not a shred of evidence supporting
defendant's contention that she was induced to enter the plea by
a promise that the State would remain silent at sentencing.
The guilty plea hearing provides more evidence that such a
promise never existed and, in addition, reveals the reason
defendant chose to plead guilty.

First, the trial court

specifically questioned defendant about the existence of any
promises:
The Court:

Have there been any promises of what the
sentence is that could be imposed?

3

At the plea hearing, her counsel made a record concerning
the Statement, underscoring her understanding of its contents
(Tr. 21).
11

Defendant:

Well, I understand there's to be no
promises made because the final decision
is yours.

The Court:

But you understand -- but you --do you
understand that? That the final -- that
the choice will be the judge who imposes
sentence, whether that be me or someone
else?

Defendant:

(unintelligible)4

Tr. 16-17.

Certainly, in this interchange, the court afforded

defendant the opportunity to reveal the promise she now asserts
was pivotal to her plea.

Significantly, she offered nothing.

The same hearing also reveals the practical reason for
defendant entering her guilty pleas, independent of her
contention that she did so primarily on the basis of the State's
alleged "promise."

In the course of the trial court questioning

defendant about her understanding and intent in entering a plea,
the following interchange occurred:
The Court:

Now, are you pleading guilty to the
elements because you feel you are guilty
of them? Is that correct:

Defendant:

No.

The Court:

Okay.

Explain that to me,

4

While defendant's final response was apparently unclear,
the fact that the court then moved on to a different topic
supports the inference that defendant's answer was affirmative.
12

D. Counsel:

Explain that, Your Honor, under -- she's
entering these pleas under Alvord [sic]
to avoid the exposure to the higher
first degrees.

The Court:

That's what you're doing.

Defendant:

(unintelligible)

The Court:

And you've been through that with Mr.
Laker and to avoid the chances of being
convicted of a more substantial or
higher degree of felony, that's how you
want to proceed. Is that correct?

Defendant:

Yes.

Tr. 15-16.

By entering her pleas, then, defendant avoided the

possibility of three first degree felony convictions, carrying
with them potential sentences of five years to life in prison.
Certainly, regardless of her later allegation that the State
promised to remain silent at sentencing, defendant received the
expressed benefit of her bargain by avoiding exposure to the more
serious crimes.
In the context of this evidence, clearly attesting to the
terms of the plea agreement, defendant's contention at sentencing
that she entered the plea because the State promised to remain
silent at sentencing, is at best a self-serving capitalization on
the prosecutor's earlier expression of uncertainty.

While the

State must fulfill any promises it makes that are central to the

13

plea agreement, defendant must first establish that a promise
was, in fact, made.

See Santobel^o v. New York. 404 U.S. at 262.

Because the record contains no evidence to support that a promise
to remain silent at sentencing was ever made, defendant's claim
that the State breached the plea agreement must fail.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this O

day of September, 1996.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

j^fU< r <L
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the
foregoing brief of respondent were mailed first-class, postage
prepaid, to Kent E. Snider, Weber County Public Defenders Assoc,

/r—
2568 Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah 84401, this jg
September, 1996.
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day of

ADDENDUM

'95 JUL 27 PC) 3 57
PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
INC., OF WEBER COUNTY
2568 Washington Blvd., Suite 203
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone (801) 392-8247
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

: STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT IN
ADVANCE OF PLEA OF GUILTY
:

vs.

:

SANDRA WALKER,

: Case No.

Defendant.

Of^OOiffi

: Judge

I hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of
the following facts and rights by my attorney, that I understand
said facts and rights, and that I have had the assistance of
counsel in reviewing, explaining and completing this form:
1.

The nature of the charges against me have been explained.

I have had an opportunity to discuss the nature of the charges with
my attorney, and I understand the charges and the elements of each
charge which the government is required to prove.
2. As explained, I am charged with crimes in Weber County as
follows:

STATE OF UTAH VS. SANDRA WALKER
STATEMENT IN ADVANCE OF
PLEA OF GUILT*
Case No.
Class or

Degree

Crime

Statutory Penalty

Possession of a Controlled
Substance with intent to
Distribute within lf0Q0
feet of a church

lst-Degree
Felony

5-life U.S.P. &/or
$10,000.00 fine.

Possession of a Controlled
Substance with intent to
Distribute within 1,000
feet of a church

lst-Degree
Felony

5-life U.S.P. &/or
$10,000.00 fine.

Possession of a Controlled
Substance witnin 1,000
feet of a church

2nd-Degree
Felony

1-15 years U.S.P. &/or
$10,000.00 fine.

Possession of Controlled
Substance witnin 1,000
feet of a church

Class "A"
Misdemeanor

Up to one (1) year
N.C.J. &/or $2,500.00
fine.

3.

The possibility of entering a plea of guilty to the

charges has been discussed with the prosecutor as follows:
Class or

Degree

Statutory Penalty

Possession of a Controlled
Substance within 1,000
feet of a church

2nd-Degree
Felony

1-15 years U.S.P. &/or
$10,000.00 fine.

Possession of a Controlled
Substance within 1,000
feet of a church

2nd-Degree
Felony

1-15 years U.S.P. &/or
$10,000.00 fine.

2nd-Degree
Felony

1-15 years U.S.P. 4/or
$10«000.00 fine.

/f^2xzs2&&a&:

Controlled

000

4.

I understand that the elements of the offenses I am

pleading guilty to are:

That I possessed cocaine, knowingly and

intentionally within 1000 feet of a church.
5.

I Know that I can be represented by an attorney at every

STATE OF UTAH VS. SANDRA WALKER
STATEMENT IN ADVANCE OF
PLEA OF GUILTY
Case No.
stage of the proceeding, and I know that if I cannot afford an
attorney, one will be appointed to represent me.
6.

I know that I have a right to plead "not guilty,•» and I

know that if I do plead "not guilty," I can persist in that plea.
1.

I know that I have a right to a trial by jury, and that

if I were to stand trial by a jury:
a.

I have a right to the assistance of counsel at every

stage of the proceeding.
b.

I have a right to see and observe the witnesses who

testify against me.
c.

My attorney can cross-examine all witnesses who

testify against me.
d.

I can call such witnesses as I desire, and I can

obtain subpoenas to require the attendance and testimony of
those witnesses.

If I cannot afford to pay the witness and

mileage fees of those witnesses, the government will pay them.
e.

I cannot be forced to incriminate myself and I do not

have to testify at any trial.
f•

If I do not want to testify, the jury will be told that

no inference adverse to me may be drawn from my failure to
testify.
g.

The government must prove each and every element of the

offenses charged against me beyond a reasonable doubt,
h.

A unanimous verdict of a jury is required to convict me.

i.

If I were to be convicted, I can appeal, and if I cannot

STATE OF UTAH VS. SANDRA WALKER
STATEMENT IN ADVANCE OF
PLEA OF GUILTY
Case No.
afford the cost of such an appeal, the government will pay the
costs of the appeal including the services of appointed
counsel.
8.

Under a plea of guilty, there will not be a trial of any

kind, and I am waiving my rights listed in the previous paragraph
and admitting that I am guilty of the crime to which my plea of
guilty is entered.
9.

There is no appellate review of any lawful sentence

imposed under a plea of guilty.
10.

No agreements have been reached and no representations

have been made to me as to what the sentence will be.
XI*

I know that under the Laws of Utah, the possible maximum

sentence that can and may be imposed upon my plea of guilty to the
charge identified on page two of this agreement, are set out in
paragraph three above.

I also know that if I am on probation,

parole or awaiting sentencing upon another offense for which I have
been convicted or plead guilty, my plea in the present action may
result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me.
12.

I know that under a plea of guilty, the judge may ask

me questions about the offense to which the plea is entered.
13.

The only plea agreement which has been entered into with

the government is:

In consideration of guilty pleas the State

agrees to reduce three- first degree felonies to possession of a
controlled substance within 1000 feet of a church 2nd-Degree. The
State further agrees to dismiss the possession of Marijiuana chagre

STATE OF UTAH VS. SANDRA WALKER
STATEMENT IN ADVANCE OF
PLEA OF GUILTY
Case No.
(Class "A") and not file other charge*they know about.

14.

I have a right to ask the court any questions I wish to

ask concerning my rights, or about these proceedings and the plea.
*

*

*

I make the following representations to the Court:
1.
years.
2.

I a n M years of age. My education consists of 12
I can read and understand English.
No threats or promises of any sort have been made to me

to induce me or to persuade me to enter this plea.
3.

No one has told me that I would receive probation or any

other form of leniency because of my plea.
4.

I understand that I may request to withdraw a plea of

guilty within 30 day of entry of the plea, but if said request is
not made within 30 days I forfeit this right.

A motion to

withdraw a plea of guilty will only be granted upon good cause and
is within the discretion of the Court.
5.

I have discussed this case and this plea with my lawyer as

much as I wish to.
6.
7.

I am satisfied with my lawyer.
My decision to enter this plea was made after full and

careful thought, with the advice of counsel, and with a full
understanding of my rights, the facts and circumstances of the case
and the consequences of the plea. I was not under the influence of
any drugs, medication or intoxicants when the decision to enter the

STATE OF UTAH VS. SANDRA WALKER
STATEMENT IN ADVANCE OF
PLEA OF GUILTY
Case No.
plea was Bade and I am not now under the influence of any drugs,
medication or intoxicants.
8.

I have no mental reservations concerning the plea.

DATED this

o2£& day of July, 1995.

/&AXY/.

L//e^

DEFEND;

I certify that I have discussed this statement with the
Defendant that I have fully explained her rights and believe that
she is knowing and voluntarily

entering the plea with full

knowledge of her legal rights and the there is a factual basis for
the plea.
DATED this Z&-

day of July,
ily, 1£95.
1S95.

DEFENSE^ATTORNEY^

J

I certify that I have reviewed the Statement of the Defendant
in Advance of Plea of Guilty and that said statement correctly
reflects the plea negotiations of the parties.
DATED this

day of July. 1995*

ORDER
The signature of the Defendant was acknowledged
presence of the undersigned Judge.

in the

STATE OF UTAH VS. SANDRA WALKER
STATEMENT IN ADVANCE OF
PLEA OF GUILTY
Case No.
Based upon the facts 6et forth in the foregoing Statement by
Defendant in Advance of Plea of Guilty, The Court finds the
Defendant's plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made and it is
ordered that the Defendant's plea of •guilty" to the charge(s) set
forth in the agreement be accepted and entered.
DONE in Court this a2.C day of July, 1995.

DISTRICT "COURT JJ&

